Moving forward faster : trade facilitation reform and Mexican competitiveness by Soloaga, Isidro et al.
Moving Forward Faster:  
 









Improved competitiveness is at the top of the agenda for Mexico as it moves to leverage economic progress made 
over the past decade. This paper evaluates the impact of changes in trade facilitation measures on trade for main 
industrial sectors in Mexico. Four indicators of trade facilitation are used: Port Efficiency, Customs Environment, 
Regulatory Environment, and e-commerce use by business (as a proxy for Service Sector Infrastructure).  
We use the gravity model results to consider how much trade among countries might be increased under various 
scenarios of improved trade facilitation. Our goal is to inform directions for specific trade facilitation initiatives with 
the highest potential to increase trade.  We examine scenarios that focus on improvements in Port Efficiency, 
Customs Environment, Service Sector Infrastructure, and Regulatory Environment. We follow a simulation strategy 
that uses a formula to design a unique program of reform for each country in the sample, and apply it to the specific 
case of Mexico. The formula brings below-average countries in the group half-way to the average for the entire set 
of countries. We focus on the below-average country on the grounds that donor attention and capacity building 
efforts should be extended to this group. We choose an improvement of half-way to the average because there are 
limited development resources and improvements take time.  
After simulating these improvements in trade facilitation in all four areas, we find that the total increase in trade 
flow in manufacturing goods is estimated to be $348.2 billion (about 7.4% of total world trade).  
The analysis in this paper indicates that Mexico has a large scope for trade promotion from trade facilitation 
reform: overall increments from domestic reforms are expected to be on the order of $31.8 billion, equivalent to 
22.4% of total Mexican manufacturing exports for 2000-2003.  On the imports side, these figures are $17.1 billion 
and 11.2%, respectively. In total exports as well as in Textiles, increases in exports result from improvements in Port 
Efficiency and the Regulatory Environment (i.e., the perception of corruption). In turn, exports of Transport 
Equipment are expected to get a greater increment from improvements in Port Efficiency, whereas exports of Food 
and Machinery seem to be more related to improvements in the Regulatory Environment. On the imports side, 
Mexican improvements in Port Efficiency appear to be the most important factor, although for imports of Transport 
Equipment improvements in Service Sector Infrastructure are also of relative importance.  
Our results show that unilateral trade facilitation reforms for the case of Mexico could generate an increment of 
more than 20% for exports as well as about 11% for imports. These estimates suggest that trade facilitation measures 
should be considered seriously in any discussion about trade policy in Mexico. 
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In the two decades up to 2001, world trade has grown twice as fast as world output (6 vs. 
3 percent) (IMF, 2001). This phenomenon was particularly important for the case of Mexico: 
while non-fuel exports grew from 10 billion US dollars of 2002-equivalent in the early 1980s to 
more than 130 billion US dollars of 2002-equivalent with an annual growth rate of 14%, the 
share of non-fuel exports in GDP grew from about 4% to 35% in the same period. Besides the 
increasing overall international demand, this extraordinary expansion in Mexico’s international 
trade has its roots in reforms undertaken in the mid to late 1980s and to some extent in the 
signing of several free trade agreements, in particular the one of 1994 with Canada and the 
United States.  By 2001, world economic growth slowed down.  
This fact, coupled with the terrorists attack on the U.S. on 9/11, impacted negatively on 
the rate of growth of international trade. In the case of Mexico with the US as its largest market, 
tthis new environment translated into a considerable decrease in export growth during 2002 and 
2003 (about 2% per annum) with a recovery only in 2004 and 2005 (about 12% per annum). In 
spite of this recovery, the dynamism showed by China’s exports, among other factors, displaced 
Mexico as the second supplier to the U.S. market. 
The Mexican government has been aware of the new challenges posed by changes in the 
international economy even before 9/11. The National Development Plan 2001-2006 states that 
improvements in the country’s international competitiveness were a necessary condition to 
achieve more dynamic growth. Two of the strategies stated in that document that were closely 
related to international trade were: i) to increase the insertion of Mexico into the “new” 
international economy, and ii) to reduce administrative costs for firms through better 
regulations.
4  
These issues are aligned with new developments in international trade policies. By the 
1990s many countries reduced their tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade as a consequence of 
adopting a development strategy that emphasized integration with the global economy (Clark et 
al, 2001). This reduction in artificial trade barriers has raised the importance of remaining issues, 
such as high transport costs (i.e., shipping costs between countries), as well as the environment 
                                                 
4 A recent document by the Secretaria de Economia makes an excellent description of the measures taken since 
2000 and on their likely impact. See, “Acciones concretas para incrementar la competitividad”, 2004, by the 
Mexican Subsecretaria de Industria y Comercio.   3
in which trade transactions take place.  This includes regulatory transparency and 
professionalism of customs, harmonization of standards, and use of information technology in 
trade, for example.  All these factors relate to ‘trade facilitation’ and politicians as well as 
researchers are shifting the focus of trade facilitation efforts inside the border to domestic 
policies and institutional structures where capacity building can play an important role.
5  
An increasingly important policy question in trade centers on estimating the impact on 
trade of capacity building projects and relative impact of differing policy reform agendas on 
competitiveness. Wilson, Mann, and Otsuki (WMO) (2004) find that enhanced capacity in global 
trade facilitation would increase world trade of manufacturing goods by approximately $377 
billion dollars – an increase of about 9.7 percent. This is based on a scenario in which capacity 
building is raised half-way to the global average across 75 countries. The authors specifically 
examine four areas: Port Efficiency, Customs Environment, Regulatory Environment (which 
includes standards), and Information Infrastructure. They find that the improvement in Port 
Efficiency results in about $106.9 billion (equivalent to 2.8% of total world trade) increase in 
trade, whereas improvements in Customs Environment results in about $32.9 billion (0.8 
percent) increase in trade. The increase in trade from the improvement in the Regulatory 
Environment is estimated in about $83.3 billion (2.1% of total world trade). The largest trade 
increase comes from improvements in services sector infrastructure and e-business usage ($154 
billion, 4.0 percent of total trade).  WMO (2004) also find that the increments in trade from 
export improvement in trade facilitation more than double those coming from the impact of 
imports on trade.  
These results suggest, in general, that increased capacity to comply with GATT Article V 
(freedom of transit), Article VIII (fees and formalities connected with importation and 
exportation), and Article X (publication and administration of trade regulations) along with other 
reforms could raise global trade for all WTO members.  
For the case of Mexico, WMO (2004) estimated that greater exports coming from 
improvements in all trade facilitation measures could be on the order of $17.3 billion. The 
aggregate nature of the WMO study does not provide for estimates of whether higher exports 
levels are equally spread among all industrial sectors or are concentrated in a few industry 
                                                 
5 A good example of this is the Colloquium on Public Policy Innovations organized by IBERGOP-Mexico in 2004. 
A clear result from it is that something beyond lowering tariffs and pursuing Free Trade Agreements should be done 
by Mexico to face the challenges in the world markets. See IBERGOP,2004.   4
sectors. This is an important issue since political economy issues would certainly impact on the 
process to achieve the reforms needed to improve trade facilitation. Therefore, it is important to 
identify key sectors that would expand in a new trade facilitation environment.  
A recent paper by Hanson and Robertson (2005) identifies changes in Mexico’s sectoral 
exports and the component of these changes that can be attributed either to growth in Mexico’s 
export-supply capacity or to growth in import demand in Mexico’s trading partners. Their 
preliminary results show that Mexico had weak growth in its export- supply capabilities, even 
during the height of the 1990s boom. That is to say, exports could have grown even at a higher 
rate than the 14% real per annum since they were not constrained by import-demand conditions 
in the United States and other destination markets. Moreover, their paper points out that 
Mexico’s sluggish export performance is not due to China’s expansion in global markets. Thus, 
according to this paper, the ball is in the Mexican court.  
The field of gravity model estimates is a vibrant one. As shown by recent papers, notably 
those by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and by Silva and Tenreyro (2006), previous 
estimates coming from gravity equations could present serious problems of bias and 
inconsistency of estimates. Thus, in this paper, we revisit and extend WMO (2004). We update 
the data and the modeling approach taking into account the new developments in the field, and 
also we extend the research to assess the potential impact that improvement in trade facilitation 
measures could have for exports and imports of key manufacturing sectors. 
Although important by itself, the issue of mapping changes in global trade to changes in 
welfare measures is beyond the aim of this paper. Our scope here is limited to make an 
assessment of the expected change in trade after improvements in key trade facilitation measures 
are taken by countries that are below the world mean in these indicators.
 6 As mentioned above, 
Mexico’s international trade faces an increasingly competitive world with relative low tariff 
levels.  The estimates in this paper, therefore, can help inform domestic debate on trade 
facilitation issues. 
 
                                                 
6 Also, as indicated by an anonymous referee, if the increase in trade actually maps into increase welfare, there may 
be positive cross-country externalities coming from improvements in trade facilitation.    5
2. Overview of Previous Work 
  The empirical literature on trade facilitation is limited, as outlined in Wilson, Mann, and 
Otsuki (2003) (henceforth WMO, 2003). In the past, researcher used a single measure of trade 
facilitation to estimate its effect on trade, finding large gains from trade facilitation efforts. For 
instance a 3% reduction in landed costs applied to intra-APEC merchandise trade, as might be 
obtained by electronic documentation, reduces trade costs by US$60 billion (APEC, 2001). A 1 
percent reduction in import prices for the industrial countries and the newly industrializing 
countries of the Republic of Korea, Chinese Taipei and Singapore, and a 2 percent reduction for 
the other developing countries yields an increase in APEC merchandise trade of 3.3 percent—
meaning the elasticity of trade facilitation efforts to trade flows is greater than 1 (Economic 
Committee,1999). Considering global estimates, a 1 percent reduction in the cost of maritime and 
air transport services in the developing countries could increase global GDP some US$7 billion 
(1997 dollars).  
If trade facilitation is considered in a broader sense to include an improvement in 
wholesale and retail trade services, an additional US$7 billion could be gained by a 1 percent 
improvement in the productivity of that sector (UNCTAD, 2001). Djankov, Freund, and Pham 
(2006) examine how time delays affect trade, using World Bank data from the Doing Business 
2006 report on the days it takes to move standard cargo from the factory gate to the ship in 126 
countries.  The authors find that on average, each additional day that a product is delayed prior to 
being shipped reduces trade by at least 1 percent.  Each day is equivalent to a country distancing 
itself from its trade partners by 85 km on average.  Delays have an even greater impact on 
developing country exports and exports of time-sensitive goods, such as perishable agricultural 
products.   
Other authors consider more specific categories of trade facilitation effort or a more 
limited country set. Hertel, Walmsley and Itakura (2001) find that greater standards 
harmonization for e-business and automating customs procedures between Japan and Singapore 
increase trade flows in overall between these countries as well as their trade flows with the rest 
of the world. Hummels (2001) finds that each day saved in shipping time in part due to a faster 
customs clearance is worth 0.5 percentage point reduction of ad-valorem tariff. Fink, Mattoo, 
and Neagu (2002a) examine the effect of anticompetitive practices in port services and other 
transport services on unit shipping cost.  Fink, Mattoo, and Neagu (2002b) find that a 10 percent   6
decrease in the bilateral price of phone calls is associated with an 8 percent increase in bilateral 
trade. Moenius (2000) finds that bilaterally-shared and country-specific standards promote trade. 
Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh (2001a, 2001b) find that 10 percent tighter food standards in the 
European Union would reduce African exports of certain cereals, nuts, and dried foods by a 
range of 5 to 11 percent, depending on the category.  
WMO (2003) and WMO (2004) developed a new approach to estimate the effects of 
trade facilitation on trade flows by constructing four measures of trade facilitation, as well as the 
independent effects of these four on the trade flows among a broad group of countries in the Asia 
Pacific region and among 75 countries, respectively. In both papers, WMO used cross-country 
survey data on the business and policy climate to construct numerical measures of trade 
facilitation for each country for Port Efficiency, Customs Environment, Regulatory Environment 
and, e-business usage (a proxy for Service Sector Infrastructure importance for trade).  
WMO (2003) find that the elasticity of increased Port Efficiency of importing countries is 
larger than the elasticity of improved Customs Environment or superior Service Sector 
Infrastructure. If unilaterally applied, more stringent Regulatory Environment will reduce a 
country’s imports. In their simulations, they find that for the APEC economies as a group, 
improving Port Efficiency, Customs Environment and Service Sector Infrastructure measures of 
the below-APEC-average economies half-way up to the APEC average for each trade facilitation 
measure yields an increase in trade of some 20 percent. Although on average the Port Efficiency 
indicator is the most important for trade facilitation, since each country has a unique set of 
indicators and pattern of trade, more detailed analysis of the simulation results shows that for 
some members of APEC, a trade facilitation measure other than ports may be the best to target 
for capacity building to increase that economy’s trade.  
 
 
3. Analytic approach 
The following sections draw on WMO (2004) and we reproduce only the key elements of 
the approach used by the authors.  This paper applies an up to date gravity model approach to an 
updated data set.  In contrast to WMO (2004) our approach presented here considers data for 
main industrial sectors in Mexico. Following WMO (2004), the definition of trade facilitation 
incorporates relatively concrete “border” elements, such as Port Efficiency and customs   7
administration, and “inside the border” elements, such as domestic Regulatory Environment and 
the infrastructure to enable e-business usage.  
 
4. Data issues 
4.1 Rationale for Selecting Trade Facilitation Indicators 
We use four distinct areas of focus that meet policymakers’ needs for specificity on how 
to approach trade facilitation efforts. They are: (1) Port Efficiency, (2) Customs Environment, (3) 
own Regulatory Environment, and (4) Service Sector Infrastructure. Port efficiency is designed 
to measure the quality of infrastructure of maritime and air ports. Customs environment is 
designed to measure direct customs costs as well as administrative transparency of customs and 
border crossings. Regulatory environment is designed to measure the economy’s approach to 
regulations. Service sector infrastructure is designed to measure the extent to which an economy 
has the necessary domestic infrastructure (such as telecommunications, financial intermediaries, 
and logistics firms) and is using networked information to improve efficiency and to transform 
activities to enhance economic activity. Besides the observation that these categories match areas 
for policy-makers attention, these trade facilitation measures also match several GATT articles 
and appear in the list of Singapore issues in the Doha Development Agenda. Therefore, they 
have salience for WTO negotiations.  
 
4.2 Constructing the Measures Used in This Study 
We use data from WMO (2003) that rely on three sources--World Economic Forum 
Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002 (henceforth GCR), IMD Lausanne, World 
Competitiveness Yearbook 2002 (henceforth WCY), and Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton  
(henceforth KKZ). See the Data Appendix for a more complete description of the sources and 
each of their methodologies for collecting and preparing data about a country. 
Table 1 reports information about these indicators. It displays each input for the trade 
facilitation indicator, the mean, standard deviation, and minimum value along with countries of 
best and worst practice. For best practice, Singapore and Finland stand out.  As the focus of this 
paper is the likely impact of changes in trade facilitation measures on Mexico’s trade, the last 
four columns of Table 1 display the absolute numbers for Mexico, as well as its ratio from the 
minimum and maximum values. It can be seen that only in two variables Mexico is an average   8
country (Hidden Imports Barriers and Transparency of Government Policies, whose ratios to the 
mean are about 1). In all other counts, Mexico is well below the mean. For instance, in Port 
Facilities Mexico’s level of 0.478 is 25% below the average of 0.636 for the countries in the 
sample. These facts suggest that there is wide room for improvement in key domestic variables 
that are linked to international trade. 
 
4.2 Trade Flows and Other Variables 
We use bilateral trade flow data available at the Commodity and Trade Database 
(COMTRADE) of the United Nations Statistics Division, for 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003. In 
contrast to WMO(2004) that uses yearly data for 2000 and 2001, to avoid our results be driven 
by particular years in what follows we use as dependent variable the average trade level for the 
four years.
7 We focus our attention on trade in manufactured goods, defined as commodities in 
categories 5 to 8 in SITC 1 digit industry except those in category 68 (non-ferrous metals). As 
indicated above, we extend what was done in WMO (2004) by using data for 4 main industrial 
sectors: Food Beverages and Tobacco, Textiles, Machinery except Transport Equipment, and 
Transport Equipment. World trade of these sectors is about 64% of total trade. For Mexico, these 
sectors represent 79% of non-fuel exports and 65% of imports, respectively. 
Tariff data were derived from the Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS) of 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). We use the weighted 
average of applied tariff rates for the manufactured goods in 2002 where bilateral trade values 
corresponding to each tariff line are used as the weights. The data on gross domestic product 
(GDP) and per capita GDP were derived for years 2000-2003 from the World Development 
Indicators published by the World Bank. All nominal figures were converted to constant US$ of 
2002 using as deflator the US Wholesale Price Index. 
 
5. The Gravity Model 
The standard gravity formulation includes various measures of market size (GDP), 
similarity of demands (GDP per capita), measures of remoteness (distance and adjacency), and 
measures of kinship (regional trade arrangements, and language/ethnic similarities). To this basic 
formulation, we add tariffs as well as the trade facilitation indicators and some additional factors, 
                                                 
7 For a rationale of doing this, see Soloaga and Winters (2000).   9
as described further below. After many ad hoc applications since the late 60’s, the theoretical 
validity of the gravity model formulation has been revisited recently by many authors. A relevant 
recent one is that of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), who derived a theoretical expression of 
the model that is similar to the one they actually estimated (previously there was a miss-match 
between the theoretical and the empirical models). In one version, their approach is implemented 
by allowing country specific fixed effects that would capture an idiosyncratic trade resistance 
term. In was follows we are not using this approach since many key variables we used in our 
model do not change by country (e.g., Port Efficiency). In a further version of this paper we will 
explore how to implement Anderson and Van Wincoop´s approach with our data setting. As 
mentioned above, a new paper by Silva and Tenreyro (2006) (S&T from now on) shocked the 
field of gravity estimates by showing that under the presence of heteroskedasticity, the 
parameters of log-linearized models--as the ones used in gravity estimates—estimated by OLS 
lead to biases estimates of the true elasticities. Since estimated elasticities are at the core of our 
paper, we have re-estimated a previous OLS-based version of the paper and applied in what 
follows this new S&T approach.
8 
 
5.1 The Econometric Model and Results 
Following S&T gravity modeling approach, the basic structure of our specific gravity 
equation is the following: 
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Subscripts i and j stand for the importer and exporter respectively. Parameter β’s are coefficients; 
the term εji is the error term, assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero. The value of 
manufactures exports from country j to i is denoted as Vji . The term Tariffji denotes applied 
trade-weighted tariff rate in the percent ad- valorem term that is specific to the trading partners i 
                                                 
8 For results coming from the conventional approach, see also Soloaga and Winters (2000). Results from the 
Anderson and Van Wincoop approach are presented in Corinne  (2005) and also in Montenegro and Soloaga (2005).    10
and j . The terms PEj, REj, CEj and SIj denote exporting country j’s indicators of Port Efficiency, 
Regulatory Environment, custom efficiency, and Service Sector Infrastructure.  
 
Similarly, PEi, REi, CEi and SIi stand for the same trade facilitation measures in the 
importing country.
9 This formulation takes explicit account of the fact that country j’ s exports 
(as well as its imports) will improve through its own trade facilitation efforts. The term GDP 
denotes gross domestic product and GDPPC denotes per capita GDP, where both are expressed 
in 2002 US dollar terms. Geographical distance between capital cities i and j is denoted as 
DISTji. . Dummy variables are included to capture the effect of preferential trade arrangements, 
language similarity and adjacency. The trade arrangements dummies include NAFTA (DNAFTA), 
ASEAN (DASEAN), LAIA (DDLAIA), AUNZ (DAUNZ), MERCOSUR (DMERCOSUR) and EU (DEU). The 
language dummies include English (DENG), French (DFRC), Spanish (DSPN), Arabic (DARB), 
Chinese (DCHN), German (DGMN), Portuguese (DDPOR) and Russian (DRUS). The adjacency 
dummy Adjacij  takes the value of one if country i is adjacent to country j and zero otherwise. To 
check for heterogeneity on the impacts across countries, we have run the above equation (1) 
allowing differences between developed and developing countries. We did this by interacting all 
variables for importers as well as for exporters with a dummy that equals one for OECD 
countries (excluding Mexico and Turkey)
10. Following S&P we assume that the error 
term ij ε follows a log-normal distribution with  1 ) / ( = variables t independen E ij ε  and variance 
variables) t independen f ij (
2 = σ . Because of this, and also taking into account that some trade 
flows in a particular year could be zero, the model was estimated with STATA as a negative 
binomial equation (i.e., a poisson regression with over dispersion). Interested readers should 
consult Silva and Tenreyro’s 2006 paper for details. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of trade variables. It can be seen that Mexico’s 
share in world’s industrial exports is 3% overall and between 2.7% (Food, Beverages and 
Tobacco) and 4% (Vehicles and Machinery) for the sectors considered in this paper. As for 
imports, overall Mexican share is about 3% also. Imports of Food, Beverages and Tobacco 
                                                 
9 In contrast to WMO (2004), that included CE only for importing countries, here we will “let the data tell” whether 
CE is only important for the importing countries. It turned out that for some specifications, CE was statistically 
significant for both. 
10 We thank an anonymous referee that pointed this out to us. It turned out that effects were indeed different for 
developing and developed countries.    11
represent about 1.6% of world’s total imports, whereas Textiles and Vehicles imports are about 
2.6% of global imports and imports of Machinery represent about 3.8% of world’s imports. The 
potential endogeneity of right hand side variables are discussed in detail in WMO (2004). Here 
we just need to mention that our estimations can only be improved when panel data with a 
sufficiently long time series in trade facilitation variables become available, which would allow 
direct attention to endogeneity. 
 
5.2 Regression Results 
The approach used here, which constructs a set of distinct trade facilitation indicators and 
deploys them in a gravity model of trade, is generally successful. Table 3 displays regression 
results for aggregate manufacturing exports, as well as for Food, Beverage and Tobacco, 
Textiles, Machinery, and Vehicles for the key variables in the model specified in Equation (1)
11. 
The model was run using a negative binomial approach (i.e., a poisson regression approach that 
allows for over dispersion of the data), robust to heteroskedasticity. For aggregate average 2000-
2003 manufacturing exports, the coefficients for the four trade facilitation measures are in 
general statistically significant. Moreover, save for the coefficient for Custom Environment of 
importers that turned out to be of negative sign, when statistically significant they have the 
expected sign and the estimated coefficients differ for the different trade facilitation indicators.  
From a policy perspective, these differences in estimated elasticities of trade flows with respect 
to trade facilitation indicator implies that different approaches to trade facilitation will 
differentially affect trade of individual countries as well as that of all countries in the sample as a 
whole. Although some coefficients are different, the estimates are generally in line with previous 
results from WMO (2004). The first four columns show different specifications of the gravity 
model for aggregate trade, basically checking possible effects of the high collinearity of the 
Trade Facilitation variables with tariff levels.  
Following the first column of Table 3, we can see that higher tariffs have a significant 
and the expected negative effect (with a –0.921 elasticity) on trade. As mentioned before, high 
levels of tariffs are strongly correlated with the trade facilitation measures we are using in the 
                                                 
11 The full set of results is presented in Annex I. Here it is worth to mention that most of the results are in line with 
the expected size and statistical significance. For instance, the coefficients for GDP of exporters and importers are 
significant and about 1 (for exporters) and 0,8 (for importers). The coefficient for the log of distance turned out to be 
about 1.05, whereas that for the dummy indicating adjacency of countries was about 0.6.   12
regression. To check whether this high correlation are blurring the individual impact of each 
variable, we run the same gravity regression without controlling for tariffs (column b in Table 3), 
without variables for exporters’ trade facilitation (column c in Table 3) and without variables for 
importers’ trade facilitation (column d in Table 3). It can be seen that main estimates are fairly 
similar along the four formulations.  
Thus, figures following column (a) are useful benchmarks against which to compare the 
impact on trade of changes in trade facilitation indicators. Port Efficiency of both the importer 
and the exporter is positively associated with trade. That is, an improvement in the indicator 
toward best practice is associated with an increase in trade flows. Unlike results from WMO 
(2004) where global trade flows get a bigger boost when the exporters’ Port Efficiency improves, 
our results imply a higher impact of an improvement in Port Efficiency of importers. The 
differences could be due to the change in the estimation approach as well as in the period 
covered.
12 So, for countries and regions that are well below the global best practice, such as 
Bolivia and Slovak Republic (see Table 1) there is great potential for improvement in terms of 
Port Efficiency.  
This is the case also for Mexico whose Port Efficiency indicators as measured here are 
13% below the average of the sample (level of .582 versus the average of 0.673). The Regulatory 
Environment, captured here by a single variable (control of corruption from the KKZ data set), 
turned out to be only statistically significant for the exporter (an elasticity of 1.191). This result 
is in line with WMO (2004) who find a bigger impact of exporters’ Regulatory Environment, 
statistically significant at the 1% level, whereas that of the importers’ had lower magnitude and 
was only significant at the 10% level. As mentioned above, we are letting the data tell whether 
we need to use measures of Customs Environment for importers and for exporters or, as in 
WMO (2004), only for importers.  
When using this variable for both exporters and importers, it was found that only the 
Customs Environment of the exporter country has a significantly positive effect on exports with 
an elasticity of 0.676, whereas Customs Environment of importer turned out to be statistically 
                                                 
12 We use two more years of data (2002 and 2003) and also estimate the gravity equations using the average 2000-
2003 of trade and GDPs for the whole period. Besides the period covered and the poisson-equation approach (versus 
the OLS approach of WMO) there are two other differences with WMO: i) for Regulatory Environment we are 
using only data from KKZ for Control of Corruption, since data from WYC on Transparency of Government 
Policies were not available for all the countries in our sample, and ii) we are using Custom Environment measures 
for both importers and exporters and not only for importers.   13
significant and, surprisingly, of negative sign. This latter result turned out to be robust (in its sign 
as well as in its size) to different specifications of model (1) and should be further explored about 
why this is the case. At a more disaggregate level (see for instance in table 3 results for Food, 
Beverages and Tobacco and for Vehicles) this variable also showed a negative impact on trade. 
Improving indicators of Service Sector Infrastructure is positive and significantly associated with 
trade at the aggregate level among the studied countries: the coefficients for Service Sector 
Infrastructure are positive, statistically significant at the 10% level and of similar magnitudes 
(0.748 for the exporter and 0.628 for the importer, respectively).  
Columns e to h in Table 3 shows results from running the gravity model considering as 
dependent variable only exports from the Food, Beverage and Tobacco industry (column e), 
Textiles (column f), Vehicles (column g) and Machinery excluding Vehicles (column h).  
Results show that Port Efficiency has a positive impact on all sectors, although its 
quantitative importance varies from sector to sector. For instance, it seems that Port Efficiency in 
importing countries has a higher impact on food imports (elasticity of 1.986 versus elasticity of 0 
for exporters). This is similar to the case of Machinery (elasticity of 1.345 for importers and of 
0.904 for exporters), while for Textiles the importance of the impact is reversed: elasticity of 
2.259 for exporters and of 1.351 for importers). The latter was also the case for Machinery 
exports: elasticity of 2.109 for exporters and 1.372 for importers). Results are also mixed for the 
variable that reflects the perception of corruption: the elasticity is 1.515 for exporters of food, 
2.096 for exporters of textiles and a very high value of 5.774 for exporters of machinery. 
Surprisingly, this variable that reflects the Regulatory Environment turned out to be of negative 
sign for the case of importers of Vehicles. These negative results remained even after trying 
different specifications of the gravity equation for this sector
13.  
Regarding Customs Environment, our results for aggregate industrial trade show a 
positive impact for exporters (elasticity of 0.676) and a negative impact on the exporters side 
(elasticity of –1.03). The positive impact on exporters at the aggregate level seems to be driven 
by the positive impact of this variable in Vehicles exports (elasticity of 3.55) and to a lesser 
extent by Textile exports (elasticity of 1.338). As for the negative impact on the importers side, 
results seem to be driven by negative elasticities in importers of food and of machinery 
(elasticities of -.815 and –0.698 respectively). Finally, we found that Service Sector 
                                                 
13 This result was also robust in a previous version of this paper when we used an OLS approach.   14
Infrastructure was important for importers and for exporters, with a positive elasticity at the 
aggregate level of 0.748 and 0.628, respectively.  
As a general conclusion for industrial exports, Trade Facilitation measures as defined in 
this paper matters, and matters even after controlling all the other variables that determine 
international trade. At the sector level, out of 32 possible impacts (32=4 sectors times 8 impacts), 
16 coefficients had the expected (positive) sign and were statistically significant, 11 coefficients 
were non significant and 5 coefficients had an unexpected (negative) sign. In conclusion, our 
results clearly show avenues to be pursued in trade policy if the aim is to increase international 
trade. As mentioned above, we do not address in this paper whether increased trade is welfare 
increasing or not.  
 
6. Changes in Trade from Trade Facilitation Reform: Simulation Results 
Following WMO (2004), we use the gravity model results to consider how much trade 
among the 75 countries might be increased under various scenarios of improved trade 
facilitation. We will examine scenarios that focus on improvements in Port Efficiency, in 
Customs Environment, in Service Sector Infrastructure, and in Regulatory Environment. Our 
objective in the simulations is to help inform policymakers on which specific trade facilitation 
initiatives might have the greatest potential to increase trade. We follow the simulation strategy 
presented in WMO (2004), which uses a formula to design a unique program of reform for each 
country in the sample, and apply it to the specific case of Mexico. The formula brings the below-
average countries in the group half-way to the average for the entire set of countries. We focus 
on the below-average country on the grounds that donor attention and capacity building efforts 
should be extended to this group. We choose an improvement of half-way to the average because 
there are limited development resources and improvements take time.  
Dramatic improvements are possible, but it is not realistic to presume a scenario whereby 
all countries in the sample are assumed to achieve best practice as measured by the nation with 
the highest score on a particular measure of trade facilitation.
14
 Since each economy has a 
specific value for each trade facilitation indicator, each country that is below-average on that 
indicator will improve by a different amount so as to get half-way to average. Our simulation 
                                                 
14 Moreover, it is the case that in the course of the simulation, the ‘average’ target will rise, and we do not take 
account of this endogeneity. By restricting the improvement to half-way to average, we limit to some degree these 
second round effects.   15
approach acknowledges the differential potential for improvement revealed by Table 1. The 
countries for which we will simulate an improvement in trade facilitation will differ by the trade 
facilitation indicator. However, because trade facilitation links exporters and importers, all 
economies enjoy an increase in trade among each other even when only some have an 
improvement in their trade facilitation indicator.  
Having the coefficients for both importer’s and exporter’s trade facilitation measures 
enables us to simulate the change in trade flow from different perspectives: for Mexico and 
others in the data set, as well.  From the standpoint of a specific country, improvement, for 
example in Port Efficiency should increase both its own imports and exports. The same can be 
expected for Regulatory Environment, and Service Sector Infrastructure, as well as customs on 
the import side. But, a country will export more not only based on its own reforms, but also from 
reforms undertaken by its trading partners as importers. Thus export gains are the sum of the 
simulated effect on exports of unilateral reform and of import reforms undertaken by the 
country’s trading partners. On the import side, a country’s imports increase first on account of its 
unilateral import reforms, and secondarily on account of the reforms undertaken by its trading 
partners as exporters. Examining the relative gains to trade from unilateral reforms as compared 
to partner’s reforms, and on exports vs. imports, and across trade facilitation indicators offers 
three dimensions of potential insight to policymakers, donors, and the private sector.  
Table 4 summarizes the results for the simulations and presents the results for the 75 
countries as a whole. In total, the collection of simulations on the four trade facilitation 
indicators yields an increase in trade among the 75 countries worth about $348 billion, 
representing an increase of about 7.4 percent in total trade among these countries. About $204 
billion of the total gain (4.3 percentage points of total world trade in manufactures) comes from 
the improvement in Port Efficiency, about $78.3 billion (1.7 percentage points) from Regulatory 
Environment, and about $80 billion (1.7 percentage points) emanates from the improvement in 
Service Sector Infrastructure. As for improvements in Custom Environment, the positive impact 
of improvements on the exporters’ side (about $ 56 billions) is more than compensated for losses   16
on the importers’ side (-$69.6 billions), rendering a net loss of about $14 billions. This latter 
result is still a puzzle for us and deserves further attention.
15  
Tables 5 and 6 summarize respectively the change in exports and imports flow for 
Mexico. The first two columns in Table 5 shows that Mexico’s unilateral improvements in trade 
facilitation measures are expected to increase manufacturing exports by $31.8 billion, which are 
equivalent to 22.4% of the average export level for years 2000-2003
16. In turn, improvements in 
trade facilitation in Mexican partners would increase Mexican exports by $2 billion (1.4% of 
Mexican exports). Combining both impacts gives a total expected increase in Mexican exports of 
$33.8 billion, equivalent to 23.8% of Mexican average exports level for years 2000-2003.  
Besides updating the estimating approach, the main contribution of this paper is the 
analysis of impacts by sector. Following Table 5, it can be seen that the simulation brings a 
higher impact of Mexico’s unilateral improvements in trade facilitation measures on Machinery 
exports (59%), and lower, although still important, percentage impacts in Textiles (41.2%), 
Vehicles (28.4%) and in Food exports (11.5%). As our simulation involves improvements in 
trade facilitation in other countries that are below the mean, Mexican exports get an additional 
boost (although only of relative importance in Food exports) from this source. In the remaining 
sectors, more that 95% of the increased exports are coming from Mexico’s own reforms. 
The impact on Mexican imports is shown in Table 6. The overall expected impact on 
imports is about $24.2 billion, equivalent to 16% of Mexican average imports level for years 
2000-2003. The simulation brings a higher percentage impact on Food, Beverage and Tobacco 
imports (19.7%) Textile imports (13.9%), and lower impacts in Machinery (12.2%) and in 
Vehicles (3.9%). At the aggregate level, about 70% of the changes in imports are due to Mexican 
reforms in trade facilitation, and in particular from improvements in Port Efficiency ($19 gains 
from Mexico’s reform divided by total gains of $24.4 billion).  
  Which trade facilitation reform measure is more important for Mexico? Table 7 shows a 
summary of results for the expected impact of own reform on exports and imports, as a share of 
the overall effect of the simulations carried out in the paper. On the exports side, Mexico’s own 
reforms in Port Efficiency (a “border measure”) are as important as improvements in the Control 
                                                 
15 Although the specification of the gravity model and the years covered by the data are different from the ones used 
here, it is worth to compare this figure with that of WMO(2004), where total export gains were estimated in $377 
billion, about 9.7% of total world trade in manufacture. In any event, expected gains are important. 
16 In WMO (2004), total export gains for Mexico were estimated in $17.3 billion.   17
of corruption (an “inside de border” measure). On the imports side, the main action is driven by 
improvements in Port Efficiency, and to a lesser extent by improvements in the Service Sector 
infrastructure. This picture varies when the analysis is done by sector. Following Table 7 it can 
be seen that for exports, improvements in Port Efficiency have a greater impact in Textiles and 
Transport equipment exports, whereas improvements in the Control of Corruption seem to have a 
bigger impact in Food and Machinery exports. On the imports side, by far the bigger impact is 
coming from improvements in Port Efficiency, although for imports of Transport equipment 
improvements in Service Sector infrastructure are also of importance.
17 
It remains for further research the question of how much would be for Mexico the cost of 
reaching half the way to mean in the trade facilitation variables modeled here. We can only point 
out that the costs of many of the regulatory reform and related improvements examined here are 
likely not a high cost, relative to infrastructure improvements. 
7. Conclusions and Approach to Capacity Building Design for Mexico 
The analysis in this paper builds on the method developed in Wilson, Mann and Otsuki 
(2003) and extends results presented by these authors in two ways. We analyze here impacts of 
changes in trade facilitation measures on trade for main industrial sectors in Mexico. Four 
indicators of trade facilitation are used: Port Efficiency, Customs Environment, Regulatory 
Environment, and e-commerce use by business (as a proxy for Service Sector Infrastructure). 
These indicators were implemented in the latest version of a gravity model of trade. The total 
gain in trade flow in manufacturing goods from trade facilitation improvements in all four areas 
is estimated to be $348.2 billion.  
The analysis in this paper indicates that Mexico has a large scope for trade promotion 
from trade facilitation reform: overall gains from own reforms are expected to be in the order of 
$31.8 billion, equivalent to 22.4% of total Mexican manufacturing exports. Most of these exports 
increase are coming from improvements in Port Efficiency and in the Regulatory Environment 
                                                 
17  As part of this analysis and in line with other studies, we found a relatively low elasticity of 
labor demand of about 0.03, positive for both, imports and exports in Mexico. When we applied 
these estimates to the expected increase in exports and imports, an increase of about 16 thousand 
industrial laborers is linked to improvements in trade facilitation measures. About half of the 
increased labor demand comes from the textile sector, which has the higher demand elasticity to 
international trade (0.062) and also the higher expected increase in exports and imports (46% and 
14% respectively) 
   18
(i.e., the perception of corruption). On the imports side, these figures are $17.1 billion and 
11.2%, respectively and, the most important single factor is also the improvement in Port 
Efficiency. Sector wise, greater Textiles and Transport Equipment exports are expected to come 
after improvements in Port Efficiency, whereas greater exports of Food and Textiles would come 
from improvements in the Regulatory Environment. On the imports side, greater imports are 
expected to come mainly from improvements in Port Efficiency, although for imports of 
Transport Equipment, improvements in the Service Sector Infrastructure showed also to be of 
importance. It will be useful to explore further which sector specific issues (e.g., risk of spoilage 
in food trade) are driven by our results, and also to better assess the plausibility of the 
unexpected negative signs found for some variables. 
  Our results show that unilateral trade facilitation reforms for the case of Mexico could 
generate an increment of more than 20% for exports as well as about 11% for imports. This 
suggests that trade facilitation measures, including estimating the costs that would be involved 





Data come from the World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report, 2001-02 
(GCR), IMD Lausanne, World Competitiveness Yearbook 2002 (WCY), and Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Zoido-Lobaton (2002) (KKZ). All survey data in GCR comes from the World Economic 
Forum’s Executive Opinion Survey. A total of 4022 firms were surveyed. “In order to provide 
the basis for a comparative assessment on a global basis, it is essential that we interview a 
sufficient number of senior business leaders in individual countries and that the sample in each 
country is not biased in favor of any particular business group. We have taken a number of steps 
to ensure this. 
 First, we have asked each of our partner institutes, the organizations that administer the 
surveys in each country, to start with a comprehensive register of firms. From this, they were 
asked to choose a sample whose distribution across economic sectors was proportional to the 
distribution of the country’s labor force across sectors, excluding agriculture. They were then 
asked to choose firms randomly within these broad sectors (for example, by choosing firms at 
                                                 
18 Follows the presentation of WMO(2004)   19
regular intervals from an alphabetic list), and to pursue face-to-face interviews, following up for 
clarifications where necessary. The employment distribution was taken from data in the 1998 
Yearbook of Labour Statistics of the International Labour Office. The respondents to the survey 
are typically a company’s CEO or a member of its senior management.” 
The WCY uses a 115 question survey sent to executives in top and middle management 
of firms in all 49 countries of the WCY. The sample size of each country is proportional to GDP, 
and firms "normally have an international dimension." The firms are selected to be a cross 
section of manufacturing, service, and primary industries. There were 3532 responses to the 
Survey. KKZ (2002) updates the data on governance that were developed in Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) “Governance Matters.” The database contains more than 300 
governance indicators for 175 countries compiled from a variety of sources in 2000/2001. Six 
aggregate indicators are constructed corresponding to six basic governance concepts: Voice and 
Accountability, Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law 
and Control of Corruption. 
The various raw data series were chosen because of their relevance to the four concepts 
of trade facilitation. 
Port efficiency for each country J is the average of two indexed inputs (all GCR):  
o Port facilities and inland waterways are :(1=underdeveloped, 7=as developed as the 
world's best, GCR) 
o Air transport is :(1=infrequent and inefficient, 7=as extensive and efficient as the 
world's best, GCR) 
 Customs environment for each country J is the average of two indexed inputs (all GCR):  
o Hidden import barriers other than published tariffs and quotas  
o Irregular extra payments or bribes connected with import and export permits  
Regulatory environment for each country J is constructed as the average of four indexed inputs:  
o Transparency of government policy is satisfactory (WCY) 
o Control of Corruption (KKZ) 
Service sector infrastructure for each country J is as the average of two indexed inputs (all 
GCR): 
o Speed and cost of internet access are: (1=slow and expensive, 7=fast and cheap)    20
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Table 1 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Global Competitiveness Report (2001-2002), Kaufmann, Kraay and 
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Table 2 
(*) For the 75 countries included in the sample 
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